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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KDAB, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Case No. 980236 - CA 
vs. Priority No. i ^ 
MARGARET JANE GORDON, 
Defendnnl Appi Ikv. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
r. M.IILV. : \ rsuiulill 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I he Defendant agrees with the statement of issues presented by the 
Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAWS 
The Defendant does not believe that there are any determinative laws which 
govern the decision in this matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant agrees with the statement of the case presented by the 
Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The Statement of Relevant Facts presented by KDAB is incomplete in an 
important respect. That omission is critical to an understanding of Mrs. Gordon's 
position. KDAB contends that a notice to extend the Term was sent via regular 
mail. The Agreement requires that it be by certified mail, return receipt requested. 
Mrs. Gordon denies ever receiving any notice whatsoever, either by regular or by 
certified mail. KDAB fails to note that the notice, purportedly sent, did not 
include the extension money of $8,125.00 as required by the Agreement. 
Agreement at Paragraph 3, page 3, KDAB's Appendix, Exhibit A; see, e.g., 
Amended Order on Motion for Summary Judgment at Paragraph 3 at p. 2, 
KDAB's Appendix, Exhibit C. It was nearly two years later when KDAB 
contended for the first time in May 1996 that the Agreement was still in effect and 
produced the purported notice of extension purportedly sent in August of 1994. 
There has never been any contention that the extension money was tendered at any 
time. 
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KDAB's argument in the trial court below was that its faili ire to pi operly 
send the notice and/or remit funds was a default by it regarding the terms of the 
Agreement. See, e.g., Order and Amended Order on Motion for Summary 
Judyiikiii 1 I 1.1'i « \[»|iiinli\ I slnluh 11 iV ' Is I ' \II s contention was that a 
notice to cure was required from Mrs. Gordon -ihi • • fx ! 
to enjoy the Option and the right to extend the Term indefinitel}. Id 
. • • ' SI J"! IP 1 \ I I: "i ' C I L R G U M E N T 
The Agreement expired by its ten ns on No\ ei nbei • • -] -^  •" ^ ing 
been extended by KDAB. An extension would have required a proper notice, 
timely sent, along with the additional payment of $8,125.00. All of which did not 
happen I he > oi dii ig of tl le Agreement ai raragraph 3 is directed to impairment, 
termination and/or forfeitm,.- >>* .^ n. u . •:
 1.1.• ,f 
KDAB's interests was the right to extend the Term. That right was never 
impaired, terminated or forfeited. KDAB did not exercise the right to extend and 
Ihi1 n"hl In cxtnul (In 11 mi lli'iieaftei cxpucd Mrs Gordon never purported to 
impair, terminate or forfeit any rights, title n? infnesi nl K 1 MH I hnr \citr 
difference between Mrs. Gordon terminating these rights or interests and KDAB 
not exercising the right to extend the Term. 
K1 PAII \\ ill UP. ii * i) HI I 11 iiiir. 11 oi ^ extension -. \i>. . erm into a "default" or 
"failure" requiring Mrs. Gordon : ^ , i--t. 
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"failure" and requiring KDAB to "cure or remedy any such default or failure 
within thirty days." Agreement at Paragraph 3, page 3, KDAB's Appendix, 
Exhibit A. KDAB's present argument is that Mrs. Gordon should have given 
KDAB notice of the "defective notification." Appellant's Brief at p. 6. Mrs. 
Gordon's response is that she did not receive a "defective notice." Mrs. Gordon 
swears that she received no notice at all. Mrs. Gordon cannot be expected to 
object to the notice being improperly sent or not including the necessary funds 
when she receives no notice at all. KDAB continues to suggest that the only 
problem is that the notice was incorrectly sent by regular mail. Mrs. Gordon's 
position, reiterated repeatedly, is that no notice of any kind was received. The 
Agreement expressly resolves any controversy over the issue of proof of receipt of 
such notice by requiring that notices be sent by a specified procedure; to wit 
"postage prepaid, certified, return receipt requested." Agreement at Paragraph 12, 
page 8, KDAB's Appendix, Exhibit A. KDAB admits that even its purported 
notice was not sent "postage prepaid, certified, return receipt requested" as 
required and based thereon, the court found there was no notice and hence no 
extension of the Agreement. Order and Amended Order on Motion for Summary 
Judgment, KDAB's Appendix, Exhibits B & C. The Agreement simply expired 
when no extension occurred. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court disposed of this case upon respective motions ioj M 
judgment filed by both of the parties. There is a central fact in dispute between the 
parties but ihr in null coun loiimJ thai disputed fact to be immaterial to its decision. 
KDAB alleged that it ii.nl vnil ,i iniin i ul extension In n. miLii nidil I I I >AIJ on 
or about August 26, 1994. Mrs. Gordon denied receiving any such notice 
whatsoever. The trial court found that fact was immaterial to its decision on the 
niolHTi" iiid | MH wd-'d IP tender summary judgment for Mrs. Gordon finding the 
Agreement had expired bv if^  nwn fcrnis (In iini i, -^ wa>. us;n 
irrespective of how that disputed fact would be adjudicated, summai *: ,.\ i • -. 
Mrs. Gordon was proper. 
based its decision on the terms or methodology employed in 
the Agreement i : :i oil : , ^ a 
methodology to avoid the contentions which KDAB makes herein 
specifically requires a procedure be followed in giving notices. That procedure 
"* 111 i 11. i \ i 1111 11 1111 * U * 11'" c r\ of any notice, k I) A B < obviously has no such proof 
of mailing and does not contend that tl lis pi oc t en ii e was follow ?£• :1 K DAB does 
not have such proof because it did not follow this procedure or alternative h in > 
notice was ever sent. Mrs. Gordon is not using this technical requirement to defeat 
> her belief that KDAB never sent any notice as 
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required and as proof notes that the procedure was not followed and no funds were 
tendered. 
Only after Mrs. Gordon's objection to further sales, did KDAB produce the 
"purported" notice of August 26, 1994. Mrs. Gordon's position is that notice was 
not given nor received. Obviously this notice of August 26, 1994 could be created 
subsequently and there is no protection against such activity except the disputed 
memory of the two participants. That is the precise reason that Paragraph 12 
requires a method of notification which embodies proof of delivery. KDAB 
admits that no such procedure was followed. This precludes KDAB's present 
argument that Mrs. Gordon should be required to provide a thirty day notice 
allowing KDAB to cure or correct the "default" or "failure." That is the core 
weakness in KDAB's legal position. There is no way for Mrs. Gordon to issue 
such a notice to "cure" or "correct" a "default" or "failure" unless she has notice of 
an effort or attempt to exercise the extension rights. She has no notice of any 
effort or attempt. 
The failure to exercise a right to extend the Term cannot be considered an 
event of default nor a contractual failure. The expiration of the time period for 
extension does not terminate, forfeit or impair any rights, title or interests of 
KDAB. In Catmull vs. Johnson, 541 P.2d 793 (Utah 1975) the Court discussed 
this aspect of option agreements; to wit: 
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Defendants urge the rule that when the time for the performance of a 
contract is indefinite, a party desiring no longer to be bound by the contract 
must place the other party in default by demanding the contractual 
performance and allowing the other party a reasonable opportunity 
thereafter to perform. 
This argument misconstrues the nature of an option agreement. An 
option to purchase or to sell is not a contract to purchase or sell. The 
optionee has the right to accept or to reject the offer, in accordance with its 
terms; the optionee is not bound, and has discretion in regard to the action 
he will take under the option. An optionee, prior to acceptance, cannot 
be placed in default by the optionor demanding performance, because 
the optionee is not contractually bound to perform any duty. The rule cited 
by Defendants applies to bilateral contracts, wherein a party who has a valid 
and binding obligation to perform cannot be defaulted prior to the other 
party's demand for performance. 
Id, at 79 (emphasis added). There is a general discussion of this topic in the 
treatises; to wit: "[a]n option to purchase real property may be defined as a 
contract... which imposes no obligation to purchase upon the person to whom it 
is given." 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser, Section 33 at 142 (emphasis 
added). "The distinguishing characteristic of an option contract is that it imposes 
no binding obligation upon the person holding the option [and] creates no 
enforceable indebtedness on the part of the person to whom it is granted." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
In Geisdorfv. Doughty the Utah Supreme Court found the nature of option 
contracts required strict and exact performance of the terms and manner in which 
the option is to be exercised. 345 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah 1998). Geisdorf 
found there is a "rule of law that barring special circumstances such as 
misrepresentation or waiver, exercise of an option must be made strictly in 
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accordance with its terms." Geisdorf at p. 21. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court recited its numerous decisions and that of other courts holding that the 
optionee must act "strictly," "precisely" and with "exact compliance" in 
accordance with the requirements of such an agreement. Geisdorf at 18. In 
Geisdorfthe Court held an oral notice of intention to renew was insufficient where 
the option contract required "written notice of intention to renew." Id. The Court 
noted that this doctrine was not "arcane ritualism at work" nor "hocus pocus" but 
simple enforcement of the precise agreement of the parties. Id. The Court refused 
to even consider Geisdorf s plea that "he had forgotten that exercise of the option 
needed to be in writing." Geisdorf at 20. Geisdorf also contended that Doughty, 
the optionor, had an affirmative duty to request a "written notice of intent to 
renew" or at a minimum so inform Geisdorf. The Court firmly rejected such an 
affirmative duty. Id. 
The general rules regarding options make it clear that KDAB's non-exercise 
of the option cannot be considered a "default" or "failure" requiring a written 
notice to cure from Mrs. Gordon. KDAB, however, argues that the specific 
wording of Paragraph 3 of the Agreement modifies and changes these general rules 
by imposing such an affirmative duty upon Mrs. Gordon. 
The wording used in the Agreement is clear and unambiguous that no such 
notice is required. The Agreement is titled "OPTION AGREEMENT;" the term 
"Option" is precisely defined in Paragraph 1 as that "option granted to Buyer in 
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Paragraph 2 to purchase all or any portion of the Property." Agreement at page 1, 
KDAB's Appendix, Exhibit A. Paragraph 2, titled "Option," provides that "Seller 
grants to Buyer an option during the Term to purchase all or any portions(s) 
of the Property for the Purchase Price." Id. at Paragraph 2, page 3 (emphasis 
added). A reading of that paragraph in conjunction with the Agreement as a whole 
makes it clear that the contract reference to "Option" is to the right to buy all or 
any portion of the property during the Term. 
The word "Term" is defined as being that "initial period of the Option" 
adding that the Term may be extended, as set forth in Paragraph 3. Id., at page 3 
(emphasis added). Paragraph 3 then precisely defines that initial term as ending at 
5:00 p.m., Salt Lake City time, on November 30, 1994. Id., at Paragraph 3, page 4. 
The Agreement in Paragraph 3 gives the Buyer the capacity to extend the 
Term by paying additional funds and giving written notice of the extension; to wit: 
Buyer may extend the initial period constituting the Term for four 
(4) additional two (2) year periods by delivering to Seller the following 
sums on or before the commencement of each such extension period, 
accompanied by written notice of such extension: 
First Two-Year Extension $8,125.00 
(On and after December 1, 1994 
through and including 
November 30, 1996) 
Id. at Paragraph 3, page 4. The extension of the Term is a different and distinct 
option granted to the Buyer. It is not the Option defined or discussed within the 
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definition nor within Paragraph 2. This is an option or right to extend the Term. 
When the Term is extended, there is a longer period of time during which the 
Option to purchase additional ground can be exercised. Thus, there are two 
options within this Agreement. The Option to purchase ground and the right to 
extend the Term. KDAB's arguments confuse and commingle the Option to 
purchase ground and the option or right to extend the Term. 
The critical interpretative clause in the Agreement is the last portion of 
Paragraph 3. It uses precise language in describing with proper capitalization the 
distinct "Option" and the "right to extend the Term." The Agreement clearly 
describes these different rights or options of the parties. These are not intended to 
be different words used to describe the same rights but a listing of two separate 
and distinct sets of rights or options. In this case we are not concerned with the 
Option but with the "right to extend the Term." 
According to the Agreement of the parties the "right to extend the Term" 
shall not be "impaired, terminated or forfeited" without written notice describing 
the "default or failure concerned (including, without limitation, that Buyer has 
failed to timely pay to Seller any consideration for the extension of the Term)" and 
allowing a thirty day period "to cure or remedy any such default or failure." Id., at 
Paragraph 3, page 4. There is no suggestion, implication or reference whatsoever 
in this tightly worded paragraph that a written notice is required prior to simple 
expiration of the time period given for exercise of the "right to extend the Term." 
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The Agreement states, however, that if there is failure to pay "any consideration 
for the extension" that such a notice would be required. But that wording 
presumes that there is a notice to extend and some failure to send or provide the 
required funds with the notice. We do have a failure to pay the funds required 
herein, but that is not the core problem which is that there is no notice even 
triggering some duty on the part of the Mrs. Gordon to notify KDAB of a defective 
effort to exercise the "right to extend the Term." 
Clearly, Mrs. Gordon did nothing in this matter to impair, forfeit or 
terminate any rights of KDAB. The Agreement by its terms expires on a certain 
date if KDAB does not exercise its "right to extend the Term." That inevitably 
leads to an expiration of the Agreement. There is no "default" or "failure" for 
which Mrs. Gordon should or can provide notice. There is no "cure" or "remedy" 
applicable to the expiration of a "right to extend the Term" of this Agreement. 
KDAB contends that the use of the word "terminated" requires Mrs. 
Gordon to notify KDAB of this expiration. However, the word "terminated" does 
not reach or apply to a simple expiration of rights. They are different words and 
have different meanings. "Terminated" implies an actor acting in some affirmative 
manner to end the rights or interests of another actor. One does not say "Time" 
terminated my "right to extend the Term." Presupposing that someone were to 
suggest such a twisted use of words, why under those circumstances would Mrs. 
Gordon have a duty to then provide notice to KDAB that "Time" had terminated 
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KDAB's "right to extend the Term." And, then just what would be the cure or 
remedy that KDAB would then exercise to reverse such a "default" or "failure." 
What the clear wording of this Paragraph 3 of the Agreement means is that 
Mrs. Gordon is not to impair or terminate or forfeit KDAB's "right to extend the 
Term" without providing notice and an opportunity to cure such default or failure 
in performance. Mrs. Gordon bears no special responsibility to inform KDAB of 
the simple passage of time or the expiration of the time period for KDAB's "right 
to extend the Term." Any other interpretation of this Paragraph is nonsensical and 
tortured. KDAB's theory is that it would have a continuing "right to extend the 
Term" absent this default notice from Mrs. Gordon. 
The "right to extend the Term" is an option given with a defined term 
beginning upon the execution of the Agreement and expiring on December 1, 1994.1 
Mrs. Gordon granted that option or right for a specified time period. There is no 
termination or impairment or forfeiture of the right when it expires after December 1, 
1994, as the right was never given for a longer period than that set forth. After 
December 1, 1994, the right no longer exists. This is not because it has been 
terminated. It is simply that the right, as given, was only for a specified time period. 
The Agreement does not enlarge the right by making it exist until terminated by a 
*Note that the time period for exercise of the "right to extend the Term" includes 
"on or before commencement of each such extension period . . . " which includes the 
commencement date. Agreement at Paragraph 3 at p. 4. 
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written notice from Mrs. Gordon to KDAB. The right is defined and described by its 
commencement and expiration date. If Mrs. Gordon was purporting to "terminate" 
the right to extend the Term then she would be required to provide notice and an 
opportunity to cure. But she is not terminating the "right" as the "right" as given was 
only for a specified time period with a built in expiration date. Any other 
interpretation of the Agreement predisposes it to an interpretation that the right exists 
until such time as Mrs. Gordon gives written notice to KDAB and allows an additional 
thirty (30) days to cure or remedy any such default or failure by then exercising the 
right. That interpretation is exactly what the Geisdorf case found untenable in option 
contracts. 
CONCLUSION 
KDAB's brief is a direct attack on the rule of law announced by the Supreme 
Court in the Geisdorf cast. That brief suggests that the expiration of KDAB's "right 
to extend the Term" is a "forfeiture," or a "default" and that the court should relieve 
KDAB of the consequences of not exercising its "right to extend the Term." The 
brief actually requests this court to relieve it of having failed to give notice, allowing a 
"cure" of the defective notice of 1994. Appellant's Brief at pp. 12-13. 
This court cannot, as a matter of law, allow KDAB to gin up a "defective 
notice" and thereby bootstrap itself into a "cure or remedy" for its default under the 
language of this Agreement. No one proposes to "terminate" or "forfeit" or "impair" 
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any right given to KDAB. The right given by Mrs. Gordon had a beginning and an 
ending date. The right simply expired. Mrs. Gordon was not required to take some 
affirmative action to terminate a right that the parties had already agreed had an 
expiration date. If she wanted to terminate the right prior to its expiration date, then 
such a notice would have been required. Perhaps, if KDAB had actually given a 
notice but tendered an insufficient sum of money or a check that didn't clear then such 
a notice might also have been required under the terms of the Agreement. But none of 
that happened. The parties have a factual dispute as to whether any notice at all was 
given. Mrs. Gordon denies receipt of any notice whatsoever. But apart from that 
factual disagreement there is a clear admission on the record that the notice was not 
sent as specifically required by the Agreement. Under the Geisdorfmling that is 
enough; there was no exercise of the right to extend the Term. The Agreement has 
expired. 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed and the case remanded for 
finalization of the acreage between the parties.2 
2The trial court's decision expressly provides, and Mrs. Gordon has always 
concurred, that additional acreage may be distributed to KDAB in accordance with 
Paragraph 6 of the Agreement. That distribution must necessarily await the court's 
decision and KDAB's formal election thereafter. 
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DATED August 21, 1998. 
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